Russia's defeat: How the collapse of Assad's regime will impact Putin's authority.

The President of Syria Bashar al-Assad has fled, losing power. Russia and Iran are assessing the geopolitical losses (with Russia, as is customary, trying to put on a brave face despite a bad situation). Turkey stands to gain, while Israel is puzzled: instead of a formally hostile but predictable country (practically a monarchy ruled by the Assad clan for over 50 years), a more hostile state led by Islamist groups could emerge next door. An informant explains why the collapse of the regime in Syria is particularly painful for Russia.

Assad fled his country because his patron Russia under Vladimir Putin was no longer interested in protecting him, writes Donald Trump following the Syrian ruler's escape. "Russia's Syrian fiasco is a result of Putin's geopolitical folly and limitations. A similar scenario could await Russia," emphasizes the head of the Office of the President Andriy Yermak. The ousting of Bashar al-Assad from power in Syria demonstrates the weakness of Iran and Russia, which had supported his regime, stated the EU's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell. What do these and other similar statements from politicians mean?

Public Humiliation of Russia

Comments about Assad's flight primarily indicate this: Russia's defeat is visible to the whole world. And everyone understands: this is a blow to Putin's plans, who, with the help of Syria, had for some time tried to prove that Russia is an influential geopolitical player (something about a multipolar world). And this influence vanished in just 10 days. That’s enough to mark Russia's "Syrian campaign" as a liability, which has long been recognized as successful within the aggressor country.

Recall that the military conflict in Syria has been ongoing since 2011. At different times, the conflict has involved the Syrian government forces, opposition forces, radical Islamists, Kurds, Islamic State militants, as well as the armed forces of Russia, the USA, Iran, and Turkey.

Russia intervened in Syria in 2015. This occurred against the backdrop of Russia's isolation that began after the illegal annexation of Crimea and the war initiated in Ukraine's Donbas. By entering Syria, Russia sought to ensure that it was "talked to" and respected—implying that supposedly no conflict in the world could be resolved without dialogue with Russia.

The second objective was to demonstrate Russia's military capabilities. These were particularly advantageous to showcase against the poorly armed Syrian factions or while bombing defenseless Aleppo (just like later in Mariupol and other Ukrainian cities).

During this period, Russia announced three times the winding down of its military operation and its contingent in Syria, yet it continued to participate in combat actions afterward. By the end of 2017, the Islamic State in Syria had been defeated, and a significant portion of the republic's territory had come under government control.

Russia also secured a couple of prized assets: the Khmeimim airbase in Latakia and the port in Tartus, where the Russian fleet was based. With traditional confidence, Putin, addressing his troops in Khmeimim in 2017, hinted that "Russia is here forever"—meaning that Russian troops received permanent deployment points in the region.

Moreover, Putin promised Syrian terrorists "unprecedented strikes" if they "raised their heads." Isn't it déjà vu? Ukrainians have heard similar threats many times about unprecedented strikes with Calibers, Kinzhal missiles, and Iskanders if Ukraine resists.

Telegram oembed: https://t.me/informator_live/3644

And now the "terrorists" have raised their heads—and Russia, according to the Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine, is fleeing from its "permanent bases" in Tartus and Khmeimim. It is urgently evacuating its aviation and fleet. Putin should remember that Ukraine and the whole world are currently witnessing the price of promises about "Russia being here forever" and threats of "unprecedented strikes."

What if Erdogan Hadn't Allowed It?

The global defeat of Russia is demonstrative and public, but some details may not yet be visible to all. An interesting post appeared on December 8 in the Russian propaganda Telegram channel Fighterbonber, which specializes in aviation topics. It announces Russia's withdrawal from its bases in Syria.

Here, the "mustached cockroach" likely refers to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. If we take this information seriously, it turns out that without Ankara's consent (and possibly corresponding instructions from Turkey to the Syrian factions under its control), Russia would not have been able to withdraw without hindrance and without losses.

If this is the case, the prudent Erdogan simply allowed Russia to "save face"—he still has to "be friends" with Putin in various formats, and such a favor wouldn't hurt. In this episode, the President of Turkey is essentially showing, including to Russia itself, who is the influential player in the Middle East and who is the object of influence.

What if Erdogan had not allowed the evacuation? And Russia, under pressure from insurgents, would have lost all its equipment, not just part of it? This would not just be a geopolitical defeat for Russia, but a military fiasco.

This situation is a miniaturized result of the Syrian campaign. Russia and Iran supported Bashar al-Assad, while Ankara backed the opposition factions controlling the Idlib province in the northwest of the country. Now Putin has lost influence, Iran has weakened (also hastily evacuating its military and diplomats from Syria), and Erdogan has taken another step towards his dream—an influential Turkey.

Russia is trying to pretend that it is still in the game and at Erdogan's level. As if it is Russia that "controls Assad" and "controls the situation." This is precisely what the statement from the Russian Foreign Ministry suggests that Assad decided to "leave the presidency and leave the country", having held negotiations "with a number of participants in the armed conflict" in Syria and supposedly giving instructions to transfer power "peacefully." Such a poker face in a failed game and a hint at another Russian "gesture of goodwill" (which is also very familiar to Ukrainians): appreciate it, we told Assad to hand over power peacefully, but we could have fought.

The President of Turkey, by the way, recently demonstrated his influence and ambitions. He characterized the military operation during which the insurgents took city after city as a "march of opposition." The Turkish leader also added that he had approached Syrian President Bashar al-Assad with a proposal to resolve the situation.

"We called Assad. We said: "Let's determine the future of Syria together". Unfortunately, we did not receive a positive response on this issue," - Erdogan stated, and within two days, Assad's regime came to an end.

Putin Realized the Geopolitical Dream of the USSR but Could Not Develop the Success

Russia, as Putin makes clear with all his might, claims the "geopolitical legacy" of the USSR. The authority and resources are incomparable, but thanks to relative success in Syria, Russia gained influence, military bases, and a sort of "geopolitical corridor" to Africa (through Russian bases in Tartus and Khmeimim, "Wagner" operatives, as Russian sources indicate, were able to reach Africa). Thus, Syria was the most important link in Russia's geopolitical strategy.

"If Russia loses Syria, it loses a military and political foothold in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, which was dreamed of by Russian tsars and realized by the USSR. And it loses a channel of military logistics for Russian expansion into Africa. Significant resource investments will go to waste," - explained military expert David Hendelman in a comment to the publication "Novaya Gazeta. Europe".

For comparison: in the 1980s, there was a whole pro-Soviet camp in the Middle East: Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Iraq (which was simultaneously at war with Iran), Afghanistan. The USSR considered its competitors in the region to be Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and, of